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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States bankruptcy law, codified in Title 11 of the United
States Code (“Bankruptcy Code” or “Code”) is a comprehensive
mechanism used to “mitigate the effects of financial failure” for both
debtors and creditors.1 In the corporate context, companies may sell off
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assets to satisfy debts,2 or alternatively, reorganize and rehabilitate their
businesses or financial affairs.3 The former option, occurring in Chapter
7 proceedings, in most cases involves unsuccessful pre-bankruptcy
renegotiations between debtors and creditors, asset sales, and liquidation
proceedings.4 The latter option, occurring in Chapter 11, offers an
alternative to the less favorable Chapter 7 option.5 The idea is that
oftentimes businesses are worth more alive than dismantled.6
To this end, Chapter 11 proceedings may alter or even extinguish the
rights of certain creditors.7 Reorganization plans may divide creditors into
classes based upon “substantially similar” claims.8 The plan need not
place all similar claims into the same class.9 When a reorganization plan
changes the legal, equitable or contractual rights entitled to claim or
interest holders within a class, that class is considered to be “impaired”;10
and impaired classes are the only classes eligible to vote for or against a
plan.11
For convenience, courts allow parties to combine related cases in
bankruptcy proceedings, specifically, for example, through “joint
administration” or “substantive consolidation.” Joint administration
allows businesses and their affiliates to coordinate joint bankruptcy

Henry M. Karwowski for their gracious guidance and support, as well as the Seton Hall
Circuit Review staff for its editing assistance.
1COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2017).
2 United
States
Courts,
Services
&
Forms:
Bankruptcy,
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy (last visited Apr. 19, 2018); see
Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (citing Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2018); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶
1100.01.
4 See W. HOMER DRAKE JR. & CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND, CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2018), Westlaw (database updated March 2018).
5 Id.
6 See H.R. REP. 95-595, at 220 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6179:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a
business’ finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay
its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were
designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.
7 DRAKE & STRICKLAND, supra note 4; see COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1,
at ¶ 1100.01 n.1.
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2018).
9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1.07.
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2018); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶
1.07.
11 See § 1124; see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1.07.
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petitions.12 This proves to be helpful in proceedings involving enormous
corporations with many affiliates and subsidiaries.
Substantive
consolidation, existing as an equitable remedy, in essence merges separate
legal entities “into a single survivor left with all the cumulative assets and
liabilities . . . . The result is that claims of creditors against separate
debtors morph into claims against the consolidated survivor.”13
Normally, to confirm a reorganization plan, the Code requires that
all impaired classes consent to the plan.14 A bankruptcy court may,
however, force confirmation even if one or more impaired classes vote
against the plan, provided that certain requirements under the Code are
satisfied.15 This forced, nonconsensual confirmation is commonly
referred to as a “cramdown.”16 Section 1129 of the Code sets forth the
requirements for a cramdown, and “contains a number of safeguards for
secured creditors who could be negatively impacted by a debtor’s
reorganization plan.”17 One provision that must always be satisfied for
both consensual and nonconsensual confirmation is § 1129(a)(10). This
section states, “if a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one
class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan,
determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider.”18
Section 1129(a)(10) has been the source of contrasting judicial
interpretations in cases where jointly administered reorganization plans
involve multiple debtors.19 On one side, proponents of a “per-plan”
approach argue that approval from at least one impaired class for any
debtor involved in the plan satisfies § 1129(a)(10) for all debtors
involved.20 In contrast, “per-debtor” proponents argue that § 1129(a)(10)
requires each debtor involved in the plan to obtain approval from at least
one impaired class.21 The resolution to this contention may significantly

FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015; see Suzanne T. Brindise, Choosing the “Per-Debtor”
Approach to Plan Confirmation in Multi-Debtor Chapter 11 Proceedings, 108 NW. U. L.
REV. 1355, 136566 (2014).
13 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 20509 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
14 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2018).
15 See § 1129(b); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1124.02.
16 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1124.02 n.8.
17 In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting In re
The Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2016)).
18 § 1129(a)(10).
19 Compare In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d at 730 with In re Tribune
Co., 464 B.R. 126, 183 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
20 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1129.02; see In re Transwest Resort
Props., Inc., 881 F.3d at 729.
21 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1129.02; see In re Tribune Co., 464
B.R. at 183.
12

298

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 14:294

affect the reorganization process; and ultimately, the per-plan approach is
a more appropriate interpretation of § 1129(a)(10).22
Part II of this Comment reviews the Bankruptcy Code and Chapter
11’s formation and purposes, compares joint administration and
substantive consolidation, and explains § 1129(a)(10)’s role during plan
confirmations.
Part III examines relevant case law illustrating
§ 1129(a)(10)’s diverging applications. Part IV argues for adopting the
per-plan approach.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Bankruptcy Code and Chapter 11
Congress created a federal bankruptcy system to promote uniformity
in bankruptcy proceedings across the nation, and to afford debtors relief
while simultaneously protecting creditors’ interests.23
The most
significant overhaul in bankruptcy law came in 1978 when Congress
enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act, establishing what is now referred to
as the Bankruptcy Code.24 As expected, different circumstances call for
different remedial actions. An appropriate remedial action may depend on
who is seeking relief and the involved parties’ underlying goals.25 The
Bankruptcy Code provides various options for relief, traditionally referred
to as “Chapters,” to accommodate these different circumstances.26
Notably, the Bankruptcy Reform Act merged the reorganization
chapters into a single chapter—Chapter 11—giving debtors the
opportunity to reorganize their businesses or financial affairs.27 Although

22

See In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d at 729.
See Daniel R. Wong, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns: Adopting A Contract
Rate Approach, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1927, 1928 (2012); Brindise, supra note 12, at 1360
(quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4); see COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶
1100.01:
Chapter 11 embodies a policy that it is generally preferable to enable a debtor to continue
to operate and to reorganize or sell its business as a going concern rather than simply to
liquidate a troubled business. Continued operation may enable the debtor to preserve any
positive difference between the going concern value of the business and the liquidation
value. Moreover, continued operation can save the jobs of employees, the tax base of
communities, and generally reduce the upheaval that can result from termination of a
business.
24 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549; Charles Jordan Tabb, The History Of The
Bankruptcy Laws In The United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 32 (1995) (citing
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)).
25 United
States
Courts,
Services
&
Forms:
Bankruptcy,
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
26 Id.
27 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 11011174 (2012); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶
1100.01; see also Tabb, supra note 24, at 33.
23
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there is still much debate over the most desirable restructuring methods,28
Chapter 11 embodies the principle that “it is generally preferable to enable
a debtor to continue to operate and to reorganize or sell its business as a
going concern rather than simply to liquidate a troubled business.”29 Thus,
in all Chapter 11 cases, the debtor’s paramount goal is to “formulate and
have the bankruptcy court confirm a plan of reorganization.”30
As such, although reorganization strives to preserve creditors’ legal
rights to the greatest extent possible, the process typically alters some or
all legal interests, and may even involve extinguishing some interests.31
This is done mindful that a debtors’ continued operations offer an
opportunity to “save the jobs of employees, the tax base of communities,
and generally reduce the upheaval that can result from termination of a
business.”32
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code gives debtors
considerable control over plan negotiation.33
To strike a balance with the debtor control, Chapter 11 provides
substantial protection for creditors.34 For example, creditors are able to
“obtain dismissal of a case that is filed in bad faith or in which there is no
prospect of a feasible plan.”35 Additionally, creditors “may obtain the
appointment of an independent trustee, or a less intrusive examiner, when
there is evidence of fraud, gross incompetence, misdealing, or other facts
that indicate that the debtor is unsuited to manage the reorganization.”36
With the exception of judicial districts in Alabama and North Carolina, all
judicial districts have United States trustees who are “required to appoint
a committee of unsecured creditors in a [C]hapter 11 case and may appoint
additional committees of creditors or equity security holders.”37
The Code additionally imposes requirements promoting fairness and
equity during plan confirmations, discussed further infra.38 Specifically,
§ 1129(a)(3) requires a reorganization plan to be “proposed in good faith
and not by any means forbidden by law.”39 Although the Code does not
28

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 21.01.
Brindise, supra note 12, at 1361 (quoting COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01).
30 Richard M. Cieri et al., “The Long and Winding Road”: The Standards to Confirm
A Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Part I), 3 J. BANKR.
L. & PRAC. 3, 4 (1993).
31 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1100.01 n.1 (quoting Brockett v.
Winkle Terra Cotta Co., 81 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1936)).
32 Id. at ¶ 1100.01.
33 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012)).
34 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129, 1141 (2012)).
35 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012)).
36 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012)).
37 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1100.01 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(2012)).
38 See discussion infra Part IV.
39 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2018).
29
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define good faith, “the term is generally interpreted to mean that there
exists ‘a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a result consistent
with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.’”40 Courts
assessing whether a plan is proposed in good faith may consider, for
example, whether the plan maximizes value or resulted from arms-length
negotiations between separate counsel and advisors.41 Creditors may find
the good faith requirement particularly useful, for instance, to safeguard
against “artificial impairment”—when plan proponents needlessly impair
claims solely to satisfy § 1129(a)(10).42
Further, in the cramdown context, a reorganization plan must satisfy
the “best interest of creditors” test under § 1129(a)(7), as well as
nondiscrimination, fairness and equity standards under § 1129(b).43 The
best interest test requires that “each creditor that does not vote to accept
the plan must receive or retain property under the plan at least equal to its
recovery in a Bankruptcy Code Chapter 7 liquidation.”44 Thus, the balance
between debtor control and creditor safeguards further the Code’s efforts
to promote a negotiation process that yields “a consensual plan under
which the debtor and a majority of creditors have agreed to both business
and financial plans that offer some realistic chance of success.”45
B. Joint Administration and Substantive Consolidation
Due to the size and complexities often attached to Chapter 11
proceedings, joint administration and substantive consolidation serve as
administrative rules of convenience to facilitate and manage these
proceedings.46 The rules allow parties to combine related cases and bring
them in a single proceeding, which helps to reduce complexities, and

40 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1129.02 (quoting In re Madison Hotel
Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984)).
41 See In re Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221, 260–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
42 See In re Daly, 167 B.R. 734, 737 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (explaining that
“manufacturing an impaired class for the sole purpose of satisfying § 1129(a)(10)” may
violate good faith requirements under § 1129(a)(3) (citing In re Windsor on the River
Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 130–32 (8th Cir.1993); In re Willows Convalescent Ctrs. Ltd.
P’ship, 151 B.R. 220, 222–24 (D. Minn. 1991))); see also In re Boston Post Rd. Ltd. P’ship,
21 F.3d 477, 482 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[I]f § 1122(a) permits classification of “substantially
similar” claims in different classes, such classification may only be undertaken for reasons
independent of the debtor’s motivation to secure the vote of an impaired, assenting class
of claims.” (quoting In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir.
1991))).
43 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7) & 1129(b) (2018).
44 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 209 n.14 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(7)).
45 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1100.01.
46 Brindise, supra note 12, at 1357.
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ultimately eases administrative and financial burdens.47 At the forefront,
a notable distinction between these two modes of convenience is that
substantive consolidation restructures the creditors’ rights, and joint
administration does not.48 In both jointly administered and substantively
consolidated cases, however, courts may enter orders to avoid unnecessary
cost and delay, so long as they do so while protecting the parties’ rights
under the Code.49
Joint administration, on the one hand, enables debtors and its
subsidiaries to place their related cases on a single docket to help expedite
the cases.50 Importantly, “[t]here is no merging of assets and liabilities of
the debtors, and [c]reditors of each debtor continue to look to that debtor
for payment of their claims.”51 Alternatively, substantive consolidation
combines various creditors’ claims against separate debtors into one claim
against a single entity.52 By combining its claims with other creditors, a
creditor agrees to be subjected to the possibility of recovering less, as all
the claims are aggregated and distributed equally among the pooled
creditors.53 Although circuit courts have articulated their own tests for
when substantive consolidation is appropriate, courts generally agree that
substantive consolidation is used to promote fairness to creditors that
relied on entity unity at the outset.54
The Third Circuit’s decision in In re Owens Corning sets forth
principles to advance when determining whether substantive consolidation
47

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1 at ¶ 302.02; see H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1977), reprinted in App. Pt. 4(d)(i); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 32 (1978), reprinted in App. Pt. 4(e)(i); see also Brindise, supra note 12, at 1357.
48 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2007); see Brindise, supra note 12,
at 1366.
49 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(c).
50 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b) Advisory Committee’s Notes:
Joint administration as distinguished from consolidation may include combining the estates
by using a single docket for the matters occurring in the administration, including the listing
of filed claims, the combining of notices to creditors of the different estates, and the joint
handling of other purely administrative matters that may aid in expediting the cases and
rendering the process less costly.
51 In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
52 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 202 (“Typically this arrangement pools all
assets and liabilities of the subsidiaries into their parent and treats all claims against the
subsidiaries as transferred to the parent.”).
53 See id. at 205.
54 In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d at 732; In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d
at 20710. Both cases cite In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d
Cir. 1988) (factors for determining whether substantive consolidation is appropriate are
“(i) whether creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on
their separate identity in extending credit; or (ii) whether the affairs of the debtors are so
entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
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is appropriate in a case.55 Perhaps most noteworthy is the fundamental
expectation that “courts respect entity separateness absent compelling
circumstances calling equity . . . into play.”56 The court also instructed
that substantive consolidation will usually address harms that debtors
caused, and should not be used to merely simplify case administration.57
Rather, substantive consolidation should be used sparingly and
defensively as a last resort remedy.58 The Owens Corning Court explained
that substantively consolidating debtor entities requires a showing, absent
consent, that “(i) prepetition [debtors] disregarded separateness so
significantly their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity borders and
treated them as one legal entity, or (ii) postpetition [debtors’] assets and
liabilities are so scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and hurts all
creditors.”59
C. Plan Confirmation and Section 1129(a)(10)
Confirming a reorganization plan is the primary objective in every
Chapter 11 case.60 The Bankruptcy Code lists requirements that plan
proponents must include in a plan, and provides additional requirements
when confirming the plan; all of which must be satisfied in the consensual
plan confirmation context.61 Specifically, § 1129(a)(8) requires that all
impaired classes—the only ones to vote—accept the plan.62 In some cases,
however, a court may confirm a plan through the Code’s “cramdown”
provision even when subsection (a)(8) is not satisfied.63
55

See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211.
Id. at 211.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 209–11 (“[Substantive consolidation] should be rare and, in any event, one of
last resort after considering and rejecting other remedies . . . . [I]t may not be used
offensively (for example, having a primary purpose to disadvantage tactically a group of
creditors in the plan process or to alter creditor rights).”).
59 Id. at 211.
60 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1129.01.
61 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a) & 1129(a) (2018); see also Cieri, supra note 30, at 5:
Specifically, a plan must classify claims; identify the classes that are not impaired; identify
treatment for the classes established; treat all class members identically; provide a means
for its implementation; not require the issuance of nonvoting equity securities; and be
consistent with the interests of creditors, equity holders, and public policy in the manner
by which the reorganized debtor’s officers and directors are selected.
62 § 1129(a)(8).
63 § 1129(a); see In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 137 BR 219 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992):
Subsection (a) of § 1129 enumerates the requirements governing confirmation of a plan. It
contains eleven paragraphs setting forth standards with regard to the plan or the proponent
of the plan. Although the legislative history states that the court is to confirm a plan if and
only if all of the requirements of subsection (a) are met, the cramdown provisions
in § 1129(b) do provide a way in which a plan may be confirmed even if the requirements
of subsection (a)(8) are not met.
56
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The cramdown provision, codified in § 1129(b), enables a court to
forcefully confirm a plan notwithstanding the presence of nonconsenting
impaired classes when all confirmation requirements, other than those in
subsection (a)(8), have been satisfied.64 The court may do this only “if the
plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect
to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not
accepted, the plan.”65 Indeed, plan proponents may not simply disregard
creditor claims during the reorganization.66 The Code mandates a hearing
to occur prior to confirming a reorganization plan, at which all creditors,
impaired and unimpaired, have the opportunity “to comment on the plan’s
proposed treatment of their claims or interests, and object if necessary.”67
In all events, § 1129(a)(10) must be satisfied to confirm a plan.
Section 1129(a)(10) provides that “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under
the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has
accepted the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the
plan by any insider.”68 An impaired claim, to repeat, is one whose legal,
equitable, or contractual right is altered by the reorganization plan.69 The
requirement in § 1129(a)(10) prevents a court from exercising its
cramdown powers when no impaired class has accepted a reorganization
plan.70 The idea is that before a court forces a plan into effect, which will
compel non-approving impaired classes “to shoulder the risks of error
necessarily associated with a forced confirmation, there must be some
other properly classified group that is also hurt and nonetheless favors the
plan.”71 Section 1129(a)(10), therefore, serves as a general check on
debtors from imposing reorganization plans that have no impaired creditor
support whatsoever.
64

§ 1129(b).
Id.
66 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1129.01.
67 See 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (2018); Cieri, supra note 30, at 7 nn.14–15 (explaining that
constitutional due process requires debtors to provide notice to creditors of, for example,
bar dates and confirmation hearings; and absent such notice, creditors may not be bound to
confirmed reorganization plans (citing In re Unioil, 948 F.2d 678, 68384 (10th Cir.
1991))).
68 § 1129(a)(10).
69 United States Courts, Services & Forms: Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basics,
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11bankruptcy-basics (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
70 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1129.02; see In re Douglas Hereford
Ranch, Inc., 76 B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (“[T]he only aspect of Section
1129(a)(10) which is perfectly clear is that a plan cannot be confirmed if each class is
impaired and no single class accepts the plan.” (quoting COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129–
31 (15th ed.))).
71 In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 147 BR
827 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
65
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III. “PER-PLAN” VS. “PER-DEBTOR”
Relative to the Code’s reform in 1978, and various subsequent
revisions, § 1129(a)(10) has only recently been subjected to split
interpretations concerning whether to apply a “per-plan” or “per-debtor”
approach; and only a small number of courts have addressed the issue head
on.72 In fact, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court adopted the per-debtor
approach for the first time in 2011.73 Prior to that, courts uniformly
interpreted § 1129(a)(10) to require a per-plan application.74 Despite the
dual interpretations, the per-plan approach formed teeth from the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc.75
A. Per-Debtor
The per-debtor approach requires that in a jointly administered
bankruptcy proceeding involving multiple debtors, “absent substantive
consolidation or consent, each debtor involved . . . must separately satisfy
§ 1129(a)(10).”76 To support this position, proponents rely on the Code’s
statutory rules of construction—provided to help construe the Code—and
place significant emphasis on entity separateness.77
In some
circumstances, parties may advocate for a per-debtor application when a
reorganization plan’s distribution scheme, although not expressly
involving substantive consolidation, otherwise effectively merges debtor
entities, thereby resulting in what is commonly referred to as “de facto”
substantive consolidation.78 Moreover, the per-debtor approach seeks to
advance the notion that convenience alone cannot sufficiently deprive
rights from impaired classes.79
1. In re Tribune Company
In In re Tribune Company, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court became
the first court to explicitly require debtors to satisfy § 1129(a)(10) on a
per-debtor basis.80 The court set the tone at the outset when it included a
72

Compare In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2018)
(applying a per-plan approach) with In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 183 (Bankr. D. Del.
2011) (applying a per-debtor approach).
73 See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 183.
74 See In re SGPA, Inc., No. 1-01-02609, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2291 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
Sep. 28, 2001); In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2549 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2004); In re Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
75 881 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2018).
76 Brindise, supra note 12 at 1369 (emphasis added).
77 See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 18283; 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
78 See In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2018).
79 See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 183.
80 See id.
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parable illustrating “an inescapable facet of human character: the
willingness to visit harm upon others, even at one’s own peril.”81 At issue
in Tribune were two competing reorganization plans between the one
hundred and eleven debtors (“Debtor/Committee/Lender Plan” or “DCL
Plan”) and holders of bonds that were issued in connection to an earlier
leveraged buyout of Tribune (“Noteholder Plan”).82 The key difference
between each plan was how it treated “certain LBO–Related Causes of
Action with the Senior Lenders and the Bridge Lenders, who loaned more
than $10 billion to Tribune in connection with the 2007 leveraged buy-out
(or ‘LBO’) of Tribune.”83
The DCL Plan settled the actions for an amount that was, according
to the Noteholder Plan proponents, unreasonable.84 The Noteholder Plan,
on the other hand, “preserve[d] all of the LBO–Related Causes of Action
and create[d] two trusts to prosecute ‘vigorously’ those claims
postconfirmation.”85 The DCL Plan proponents argued that this cut
against creditors’ best interests because, under the Noteholder Plan, the
majority of distributions were contingent upon outcomes in protracted and
risky litigation.86 The DCL Plan proponents also argued that the
Noteholder Plan contained “fundamental flaws that prevent[ed]
confirmation under Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a),” and effectively treated
“all impaired classes as though they were creditors of a single entity for
purposes of § 1129(a)(10).”87 This, the DCL Plan proponents argued, was
at odds with the proper, per-debtor approach to § 1129(a)(10).88 Of
course, this contrasted with the Noteholder Plan proponents’ contention
that the per-plan, not per-debtor, approach applies when, as here, “all
debtor entities are the subject of the same joint plan of reorganization.”89
Additionally, although the DCL Plan proponents sought a per-debtor
application, at this point neither the DCL Plan nor the Noteholder Plan
obtained an impaired accepting class for each debtor involved.90 In fact,
out of the one hundred and eleven debtors that needed impaired accepting
classes—according to the per-debtor approach—the DCL Plan received
affirmative support of only seventy-two debtors, and the Noteholder Plan

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 135.
Id.
Id. at 135–36.
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Id. at 136, 181 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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Id. at 181 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 180.
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received affirmative support of only two debtors.91 The DCL Plan
proponents, however, argued that their plan “received broad support and
was accepted by an impaired class at every [d]ebtor for which votes were
cast,” and that “there is a substantial difference between affirmative
rejection of a plan and simple creditor inaction.”92 The DCL Plan
proponents further argued that the Noteholder Plan, in contrast, “received
the affirmative support of only three out of 256 impaired classes.”93
The Tribune Court observed the precedential scarcity for the issue at
hand, and upon doing so, distinguished three cases applying the per-plan
approach to overrule creditors’ objections.94 First, the Tribune Court noted
that although the bankruptcy court in In re SGPA, Inc. held that it was
“unnecessary ‘to have an impaired class of creditors of each Debtor to vote
to accept the Plan,’” the SGPA Court explicitly recognized that under the
plan, “the objecting creditors suffered no adverse effect and that the result
would not have changed if the debtors had been substantively
consolidated.”95 Second, the Tribune Court explained that the bankruptcy
court in In re Enron Corp., partially relying on SGPA, decided that “the
substantive consolidation component of the global compromise allowed
confirmation of a 177–debtor joint plan when at least one class of impaired
claims voted to accept the plan.”96 The Enron Court reviewed the global
compromise that included all the debtors and determined that it was fair
and reasonable to the creditors, mainly because it would reduce otherwise
enormous potential litigation costs and delays that would substantially
lower recoveries.97 Last, the Tribune Court explained that in In re Charter
Communications, the bankruptcy court “overruled an objection that
certain classes of creditors were ‘artificially’ impaired to meet the
§ 1129(a)(10) requirement.”98 Ultimately, however, the Tribune Court
maintained that despite these cases’ discussions of § 1129(a)(10), “none
of the three courts considered the § 1129(a)(10) issue central to its decision
in the matter before it.”99
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In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 180.
Id. (emphasis in original).
93 Id. (emphasis in original).
94 See id. at 181.
95 See id. (citing In re SGPA, Inc., No. 1-01-02609, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2291, at *19
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sep. 28, 2001)).
96 Id. (quoting In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2549, at *234–
35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2004)).
97 In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 181–82 n.64 (citing In re Enron Corp., 2004 Bankr.
LEXIS 2549, at *134–35) (internal quotations omitted).
98 Id. at 182 (discussing In re Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009)).
99 Id. at 182.
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The Tribune Court turned to the Code’s rules of construction to
discern § 1129(a)(10)’s plain meaning.100
Specifically, the court
concluded that § 102(7)—providing that “the singular includes the
plural”—can properly “ascrib[e] the plural to the meaning of ‘plan’ in
§ 1129(a)(10) . . . .”101 The court reasoned that since the proposed plans
contained language expressly assuring that the debtors’ estates would not
be substantively consolidated, “[t]he practical effect . . . is that each joint
plan actually consists of a separate plan for each Debtor.”102
Consequently, the court emphasized, “[i]n the absence of substantive
consolidation, entity separateness is fundamental.”103
Next, the Tribune Court considered the statutory context, and
instructed that “§ 1129(a)(10) must be read in conjunction with the other
subsections of § 1129(a) . . . when considering rights of impaired
unsecured creditors.”104 The court first noted that despite the fact that both
§ 1129(a)(1) and § 1129(a)(3) state the word “plan” in the singular, neither
statute can “be met if only one or more—but fewer than all—debtors
proposing a joint plan satisfies them[.]”105 Additionally, the court
explained that under the “best interest of creditors” test in § 1129(a)(7),
the words “each impaired class” must be read “as an entitlement to the
prescribed treatment for every impaired class of creditors for each debtor
which is part of a joint plan.”106 The court further explained that
“§ 1129(a)(8) mandates one of two outcomes—satisfaction by consent
((a)(8)(A)) or nonimpairment ((a)(8)(B)).”107 The court, however,
acknowledged that a cramdown confirmation under § 1129(b) “relieves a
plan proponent from the § 1129(a)(8) requirement if all other § 1129(a)
requirements are met,” so long as the proposed plan satisfies additional
fairness and equity standards towards impaired classes.108
Finally, the Tribune Court observed that in “large, complex,
multiple-debtor [C]hapter 11 proceedings,” debtors commonly take
certain steps to convenience the parties and the courts.109 For instance,
debtors may file joint plans, or, as in this case, propose plans containing a
single distribution scheme “without regard to where assets are found or
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Id.
Id.
102 Id.
103 In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182 (citing In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211
(3d Cir.2007)).
104 Id. at 182 (citing King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)).
105 Id. at 183.
106 Id. at 183 (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)).
107 Id. at 183 (discussing § 1129(a)(8)).
108 Id.
109 In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 183.
101

308

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 14:294

where liabilities lie.”110 Nevertheless, the court mandated, “convenience
alone is not sufficient reason to disturb the rights of impaired classes of
creditors of a debtor not meeting confirmation standards.”111 Accordingly,
the Tribune Court held that § 1129(a)(10), “absent substantive
consolidation or consent, must be satisfied by each debtor in a joint plan,”
and neither plan here satisfied the requirement.112
Briefly extending its § 1129(a)(10) discussion, the Tribune Court
provided ways for plan proponents to overcome § 1129(a)(10) hurdles.113
Specifically, with respect to creditor inaction when voting for a plan, the
court stated that “‘deemed acceptance’ by a non-voting impaired class, in
the absence of objection, constitute[s] the necessary ‘consent’ to a
proposed ‘per plan’ scheme[.]”114 The court relied on a sister bankruptcy
court’s decision, which allowed “deemed acceptance” based on a proposed
plan including an explicit, well-advertised, bold text presumption of
deemed acceptance when a class eligible to vote on the plan does not.115
“Alternatively,” the Tribune Court advised, “a plan proponent
could . . . drop from a proposed joint plan those debtors that do not or
cannot meet the § 1129(a)(10) requirement.”116
B. Per-Plan
The per-plan approach submits that if any debtor involved in a
reorganization plan obtains approval from at least one of its impaired
classes, § 1129(a)(10) will be satisfied for all debtors involved in the
plan.117 Per-plan approach proponents largely base their interpretation on
the statute’s plain language.118 The proponents do not consider
§ 1129(a)(10) to be a primary creditor safeguard in a reorganization plan
confirmation proceeding.119 Rather, § 1129 includes several statutory
requirements designed to more appropriately and effectively protect
impaired class-members’ interests.120
110

Id.
Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 183–84 (discussing In re Adelphia Commc’ns
Corp., 368 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
116 Id. at 184.
117 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, at ¶ 1129.02; see, e.g., In re Transwest
Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2018).
118 See In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d at 729–30; In re SGPA, Inc., No.
1-01-02609, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2291, at *1819 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sep. 28, 2001).
119 In re SGPA, Inc., 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2291, at *19.
120 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (best interests tests); § 1129(b) (“fair and
equitable” requirements during cramdowns).
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1. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc.
In In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that
§ 1129(a)(10) requires a per-plan approach.121 There, five related entities
(collectively “Debtors”) filed jointly for Chapter 11 bankruptcy three years
after acquiring two hotel resort properties.122 The acquisitions were
financed by two loans.123 First—the “Operating Loan”—JPMCC 2007CA Grasslawn Lodging, LLC (“Lender”) issued a $209 million mortgage
loan to the two entities that owned and operated the resort properties
(“Operating Debtors”) in exchange for security interest in the properties.124
Second—the “Mezzanine Loan”—Ashford Hospitality Finance, LP
(“Mezzanine Lender”) issued a $21.5 million loan to another two entities
that solely owned the Operating Debtors (“Mezzanine Debtors”) in
exchange for security interest in the Operating Debtors.125
After the Debtors filed jointly for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the Lender
filed a $298 million claim for the Operating Loan, and the Mezzanine
Lender filed a $39 million claim for the Mezzanine Loan; the Lender
subsequently acquired the Mezzanine Lender’s claim.126 The Debtors’
proposed reorganization plan (the “Plan”), to be jointly administered and
not substantively consolidated, involved ultimately “extinguishing the
Mezzanine Debtors’ ownership interest in the Operating Debtors.”127 The
Plan additionally restructured the Lender’s loan to include “a due-on-sale
clause requiring the Debtors to pay the Lender the outstanding balance of
the restructured loan in the event the Resorts were sold,” but negated the
clause if the resort properties were sold during a specified time period.128
The Lender objected to the Plan based on, among other reasons,
§ 1129(a)(10).129 The Lender’s position was that § 1129(a)(10) applies on
a per-debtor basis, and since the Lender was the only impaired claim
against the Mezzanine Debtors, and did not assent to the Plan, the Debtors
could not satisfy the Section.130 Despite this objection, “the bankruptcy
court approved a ‘cramdown’ reorganization plan,” and the district court
affirmed.131
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Affirming the lower courts’ decisions to apply a per-plan approach,
the Ninth Circuit primarily based its determination on the statute’s plain
language.132 The court first noted that § 1129(a)(10) “makes no distinction
concerning or reference to the creditors of different debtors under ‘the
plan,’ nor does it distinguish between single-debtor and multi-debtor
plans.”133 Rather, “[u]nder its plain language, once a single impaired class
accepts a plan, section 1129(a)(10) is satisfied as to the entire plan.”134
The court expressed deference to Congress’s choice not to “require[] plan
approval from an impaired class for each debtor involved in a plan.”135
Unlike the Tribune Court, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument
that “section 102(7) requires that section 1129(a)(10) apply on a ‘per
debtor’ basis.”136 Further, regarding the Lender’s assertion that the “other
subsections in section 1129(a) indicate that section 1129(a)(10) must
apply on a ‘per debtor’ basis,” the Ninth Circuit found the argument to be
“essentially a regurgitation of a summary of the Tribune decision
unsupported by argument or other case law.”137 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit majority held that § 1129(a)(10) applies on a per-plan basis.138
In his concurrence, Judge Friedland addressed the argument that
applying a per-plan approach to this Plan would effectively result in “de
facto” substantive consolidation of the Debtor entities.139 Although the
concurrence agreed that the Plan’s distribution scheme “effectively
merged the Debtor entities,” the Plan was to blame for the “de facto”
substantive consolidation, not the per-plan approach to § 1129(a)(10).140
Therefore, the concurrence instructed, “if a creditor believes that a
reorganization improperly intermingles different estates, the creditor can
and should object that the plan—rather than the requirements for
confirming the plan—results in de facto substantive consolidation.”141
IV. SECTION 1129(A)(10) REQUIRES A PER-PLAN APPROACH
The issue, to reiterate, is whether, in a jointly administered
proceeding involving multiple debtors, § 1129(a)(10) requires that any
debtor involved obtains plan approval from at least one impaired class
(per-plan), or rather each debtor involved obtains such plan approval (per132
133
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debtor).142 The Tribune Court created the split interpretation when it
declared that § 1129(a)(10) requires a per-debtor application.143 Despite
this departure, courts should recognize, as did the Ninth Circuit, that the
Bankruptcy Code requires § 1129(a)(10) to be applied on a per-plan
basis.144 In support, courts should primarily focus on § 1129(a)(10)’s plain
language.145 Courts should also note a problem arises when parties suggest
that jointly administering plans involving multiple debtors, absent
substantive consolidation, effectively creates separate individual plans.
Moreover, reorganization plans, not a particular statutory interpretation,
cause “de facto” substantive consolidation; and the Code includes creditor
safeguards that more appropriately enable courts to address “de facto”
substantive consolidations during cramdowns than § 1129(a)(10).146
Properly interpreting the Code and exercising appropriate creditor
safeguards will, consequently, allow courts to reconcile the per-plan
approach with entity separateness principles mandated in Owens
Corning.147
The foremost reason courts should adopt the per-plan approach is
because the per-debtor approach is contrary to § 1129(a)(10)’s plain
language. Section 1129(a)(10) provides:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are
met: . . . (10) If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class
of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined
without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider. 148

Indeed, the subsection requires only “one class of claims that is
impaired under the plan” to vote in favor of the plan.149 Well-settled
statutory interpretation canons require courts to “presume[] that Congress
says in the statute what it means,”150 especially when the text is
unambiguous.151 As such, “[i]f the statutory language is plain, [courts]
must enforce it according to its terms.”152 Applying these canons to
§ 1129(a)(10) requires courts to allow any debtor in a jointly administered,
multi-debtor proceeding to satisfy the subsection for all debtors involved.
142
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146 Id. at 732–33 (Friedland, J., concurring).
147 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2007).
148 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2018) (emphasis added).
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150 In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc., 881 F.3d at 730 (citing BedRoc Ltd., LLC v.
United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)).
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Per-debtor proponents, such as the Tribune Court, use the Code’s
statutory construction rule § 102(7)—”the singular includes the plural”—
to pluralize the word “plan” in § 1129(a)(10).153 However, this application
is improper and misguiding. Even upon amending the word “plan” to
“plans,” it still remains that “at least one class of claims that is impaired
under the plans has accepted the plans.”154 Courts should be hard-pressed
to read the words “at least one class of claims” as requiring anything more
than one impaired assenting class to satisfy § 1129(a)(10) for all debtors
involved.
Moreover, a practical dilemma arises when considering the notion
that a joint plan involving multiple debtors, without substantive
consolidation, effectively creates “a separate plan for each [d]ebtor.”155
Although it is true that, absent substantive consolidation, debtor-entity
separateness is essential, if a court were to consider each debtor to be
proceeding under a separate plan, debtors with assenting impaired classes,
having satisfied § 1129(a)(10), could confirm and move forward with their
plans without approval from other debtors’ impaired classes. Under the
Tribune Court’s analysis, however, plan proponents would need to “drop
from a proposed joint plan those debtors that do not or cannot meet the
§ 1129(a)(10) requirement.”156 This necessarily means that the debtors
would not be proceeding under their own separate plans.157
Further, § 1129(a)(10) is not the appropriate subsection under which
creditors should seek to protect substantive rights. Under the Code,
§ 1122(a) enables a reorganization plan to group substantially similar
claims together in particular classes.158 Sections 1122(a) and 1129(a)(10)
together enable, in some cases, a single impaired class member to bind
other impaired classes to a plan. An impaired dissenting creditor being
treated improperly under a plan can and should object based on the
creditors’ best interests test in § 1129(a)(7) or, during cramdowns, fairness
and equity principles in § 1129(b).159
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The same is true in joint proceedings involving multiple debtors. In
this regard, per-debtor proponents seem to lose the forest for the trees. The
Tribune Court injected entity separateness principles into § 1129(a)(10) to
protect impaired creditors’ rights and, ultimately, adopt a per-debtor
approach.160 Section 1129(a)(10), however, does not aim to protect
creditors’ substantive rights, but rather serves as a technical requirement
to ensure that a plan is not without any impaired class’s support.161 “De
facto” substantive consolidation must, therefore, result from a
reorganization plan’s distribution scheme, not from a particular statutory
interpretation.162
Sections 1129(a)(7) and 1129(b) should be used to protect creditors
from mistreatment in a reorganization plan, specifically where distribution
schemes result in “de facto” substantive consolidation.
Indeed,
substantive consolidation is rooted in fairness principles, and requires a
fact-intensive analysis when determining whether its use is appropriate.163
The Third Circuit’s decision in Owens Corning expressly burdens
substantive consolidation proponents to prove that consolidation is
appropriate.164 Proponents may, for example, present contracts setting
expectations that the debtors were one indistinguishable entity; and in all
cases, proponents must show that “they actually and reasonably relied on
debtors’ supposed unity.”165 However, notwithstanding such proof,
creditors opposing substantive consolidation can defeat the proponent
creditors’ reliance on debtor-unity “if they can prove they are adversely
affected and actually relied on debtors’ separate existence.”166
Sections 1129(a)(7) and 1129(b)—not § 1129(a)(10)—give creditors
an opportunity to challenge and defeat, based on entity separateness
principles set forth in Owens Corning, a plan that inappropriately merges
debtor entities.167 As such, courts should refrain from expanding a
160
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technical requirement in subsection (a)(10) and, instead, turn to
substantive rights protections in subsections (a)(7) and (b) to produce just
results. To illustrate, when the Tribune Court determined that the three
bankruptcy cases adopting a per-plan approach were not authorities on
which it should rely, largely because § 1129(a)(10)’s interpretation was
not central to those cases’ outcomes, it overlooked the reasons implicit in
those courts’ choices not to primarily focus on the split interpretation.168
The SGPA Court, finding the per-debtor argument to be
unpersuasive, conducted a fact-intensive analysis that involved
extensively examining the parties’ interests and potential for adversity
under a jointly proposed plan.169 The court concluded that the plan sought
to maximize creditors’ recoveries, and the objecting creditors were the
only ones truly opposing the plan.170 Although the court did not explicitly
state whether the plan effectively resulted in substantive consolidation, it
determined that, regardless, the plan did not adversely affect the objecting
creditor—something Owens Corning requires an objecting creditor to
show once a court determines that the circumstance is one that warrants
substantive consolidation.171 Notably, the court reached its conclusion
after spending considerable time discussing the “fair and equitable”
requirements in § 1129(b), an issue it considered to be the “heart of the
matter.”172 The court relied far less on § 1129(a)(10), and alluded to
supporting debtors’ position that “section 1129(a)(10) is a technical
requirement for confirmation rather than a substantive right of objecting
creditors.”173
The Enron Court, addressing head on whether substantive
consolidation was appropriate, also treated § 1129(a)(10) as a technical
requirement, rather than using it to protect substantive rights.174 In its
analysis, the court applied principles mirroring those set forth in Owens
Corning to conclude that substantive consolidation was appropriate. For
example, the court observed that there was “extensive entanglement”
between the debtors, and attempting to separate them would substantially
168
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dilute creditors’ recoveries.175 Additionally, parties relied on debtor-unity,
and creditors objecting to substantive consolidation adduced no evidence
showing their reliance on separateness.176 The Enron Court concluded that
substantive consolidation under the plan was appropriate, and did not
“discriminate unfairly,” but rather was “fair and equitable” in accordance
with § 1129(b).177
The Charter Communications Court, facing what it described as
“perhaps the largest and most complex prearranged bankruptcies ever
attempted,” opted for a per-plan approach in a jointly administered
proceeding.178 The court determined that the proposed plan complied with
§§ 1129(a)(3), (a)(7), (a)(10), and (b).179 The court thereafter rejected the
objecting creditors’ argument that the plan was the “functional equivalent
of substantive consolidation.”180 The court reasoned that the objecting
creditors were “receiving significant consideration under the [p]lan that is
greater than what such creditors would receive if Charter were liquidated,”
which along with satisfying § 1129(a)(7), inadvertently complies with
Owens Corning’s principle that substantive consolidation be used to
remedy identifiable harms that entangled affairs caused while not
adversely affecting objecting creditors that relied on entity separateness.181
Therefore, courts may treat § 1129(a)(10) as a technical requirement
and apply a per-plan approach, irrespective of whether the proceeding
involves one debtor or multiple, while adhering to Owens Corning’s
guiding principles regarding substantive consolidation.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 1129(a)(10) has been the source of split interpretations in
jointly administered proceedings involving multiple debtors. Although
the Tribune Court read this Section to require that before confirming a
plan, each debtor obtain approval from an impaired class (per-debtor), the
proper interpretation enables any debtor obtaining approval from an
impaired class to satisfy the Section’s requirement for all debtors involved
(per-plan). The per-plan approach is chiefly founded in the Section’s plain
language, even when pluralized using the Code’s rule of construction
§ 102(7). Courts should resolve unfair distribution schemes, such as those
resulting in “de facto” substantive consolidation, through objections based
175
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on a plan’s details, and not a particular statutory interpretation.
Accordingly, this will allow courts to properly reconcile the per-plan
approach to § 1129(a)(10) with substantive consolidation principles
mandated in Owens Corning.

